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<item>
  <title>Coworking with an Auto Memory Doll</title>
  <link>https://steele-research.com/notes/coworking-with-an-auto-memory-doll/</link>
  <description><![CDATA[ 




<div class="reading-metrics" aria-label="3,872 words; estimated reading time: 20 minutes">
<p>3,872 words · 20 min read</p>
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<section id="preface" class="level2">
<h2 data-anchor-id="preface"><em>Preface</em></h2>
<p><em>In this post I attempt to convey some thoughts and feelings that have been sat with me recently. The first half of this post is almost word for word the stream of consciousness prompt that I provided to ChatGPT which then provided its retelling of this in the second half. I say “almost” for the first part because I did ask it to provide me a grammar and spelling check for obvious errors and then I provided a final editorial pass before deciding to publish (mostly dropping the damned em dashes it decided to add which I don’t think I have ever used in my own writing). This is perhaps a little disingenuous given I want to, in some sense, emulate the process of a person sitting with a Doll to write a letter. But, I do tend to proof my stream of consciousness written communication all the time anyway prior to ever hitting send, publish etc. My writing has often followed this method, which certainly isn’t unique. Well, actually, usually I start to “write” what I want to say in my head, often in some detail, before ever taking up a pen or striking a key (if you really want to know, I was lying in the bath listening to Evan Call’s fantastic soundtrack to Violet Evergarden, Automemories, about an hour prior to publishing this, when I started to flesh out this idea for a post). Nonetheless, even when my first written draft starts in some sense as a stream of consciousness piece of writing, it will still receive some level of editing before that written form is communicated. I felt it was necessary to be clear about that for this post. What follows my somewhat edited stream of consciousness is what ChatGPT, the “Doll”, produced from it in this instance.</em></p>
<p><em>I do want to make it clear that I do not intend to use agents for writing for this site, nor for my scientific writing, outside of the smaller tasks I note in the post body. Checking spelling, grammar, syntax. Taking bullet points of ideas I am struggling to coherently express and helping to “flesh them out” for me to then put back into my own words. Summarising my stream of consciousness writing for me to help sharpen its ideas I can then re-write myself. Cutting things down to dumb word limits imposed by journals. And everything with my final editorial pass.</em></p>
<hr>
</section>
<section id="my-stream-of-consciousness" class="level2">
<h2 data-anchor-id="my-stream-of-consciousness">My Stream of Consciousness</h2>
<p>For a while, I was not using agents at all. I remember it feeling so alien to me when speaking with others whose first instincts seemingly had shifted to “ask ChatGPT” for almost every problem they encountered, even ones that were literally just informational recall. I wasn’t even really using agents for coding outside of a few forays until perhaps a year and a half ago. I was still largely googling and then trawling places like stackoverflow and stackexchange when I encountered problems. Then I began to shift towards using agents mostly in chat mode: to debug problems with my code, suggest better ways of doing things, or quickly supply example code that I could adapt and use.</p>
<p>Where possible, I avoided using them for writing. Aside from administrative tasks such as creating summaries or abstracts, particularly for the latter reducing them to fit journal word limits, I wanted to retain ownership of my writing. Even then though, I had started to sometimes use them for more creative tasks. For example, developing ideas for RPG scenarios from a seed that had popped into my head from somewhere, and particularly handling the tiresome tasks of creating NPCs, stat sheets etc. Very, very occasionally I would use them for certain writing tasks, typically providing my stream of consciousness writing and then asking for a summary, or examples developed from this, to help me get started or drafts that I could then edit. A bit like I am doing now.</p>
<p>It was only recently that something one of our technical founders at MacroFactor said gave me the kick I needed to move towards using agents in a coworking mode. He said that he simply does not code himself anymore, because Claude (or any sufficiently capable agent) does it better and with fewer mistakes. Instead, he knows what he wants the code to do. He can set prompts, provide context and guardrails, and then review the result.</p>
<p>I am not the best coder. I have terrible workflows and, although I try to work reproducibly and transparently and think I am relatively good at doing so compared with many people in my field, I mess things up all the time. What I do have is substantive expertise in the ideas, models, analyses, and inferential targets that I want to work towards, develop, or achieve.</p>
<p>I think this is where having the expertise required to use tools like these agents properly becomes essential. Given the complexity of some of the things I currently work on, I can readily imagine that it would be difficult for many people in my field even to know where to begin in order to get the most from these tools.</p>
<p>It has been an interesting experience.</p>
<p>For several years, I have been carefully trying to prune my to-do list and reduce my work-related obligations. While I was in academia, I found myself in the position familiar to many people: struggling to say “no” to anything that seemed interesting and becoming involved in far too many projects.</p>
<p>There was always an element of the incentive structures at work, even if I do not like admitting it. For me though, the incentive was not just conventional career advancement. It was also the urge to take on projects and continue playing my role in trying to raise the quality of things, “push the field forward” methodologically, and in terms of transparency, reproducibility and so on.</p>
<p>Eventually, however, I began saying “no” more often. I shifted towards wanting to do less, but to do it with greater quality. I had come to recognise that even my own work was not up to scratch, despite probably being far above the average in the field.</p>
<p>That shift was also partly born of how much this work consumed my spare time. I would work early in the morning and late in the evening. I would work at weekends. I would become obsessive about whatever I was doing. This was part of the reason I recently deleted social media.<sup>1</sup></p>
<p>This past week, I started watching <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Violet_Evergarden"><em>Violet Evergarden</em></a>. While this is probably not a new reading of it (and is perhaps one that I suspect would upset many fans if there were a comment section to complain in here) I saw in it some themes that touched upon things I have recently been feeling and thinking about.</p>
<p>There is perhaps an irony here, if I am using that term correctly which I am sure I, like most people, often do not. Nowadays, people seem in many respects to use agents like Auto Memory Dolls.</p>
<p>I am not suggesting that this was an intended theme of the anime, nor that it was somehow prophetic. It almost certainly was not. The story is about much more… recovery, learning about emotions and how to express them, connecting with people and understanding how to understand them. The show is considerably deeper than the simple observation that Auto Memory Dolls resemble AI agents.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, I am sitting here now, writing to an agent and asking it to help shape my ideas. I cannot help thinking that this is, in large part, what the industry of Dolls was created to do: to help people express themselves.</p>
<p>Over the past couple of weeks, I have begun to realise just how damned good these frontier agents are at coworking, and in many respects it has left me reeling.</p>
<p>They are simply better than I am at coding and at many of the workflows surrounding it. Provided that I give them the necessary scientific and statistical guidance, they can often do the work faster and with fewer errors than I can.</p>
<p>Even in writing tasks, they are becoming better and better at identifying simple mistakes in my own work. I have begun delegating to them a task that I used to do quite frequently myself. Much of my writing begins with seeds that I set down as bullet points, then return to and cultivate over time. For the website<sup>2</sup>, for example, I supplied an agent with my social-media history and asked it to draft notes around the key topics I had posted about, which I could eventually write out in full myself.</p>
<p>In this case, I am writing a long stream of consciousness essay into ChatGPT and asking it to reproduce what I have written as a draft note for my website, retaining as much of my wording as possible while correcting the grammar, spelling and syntax. At the same time, I am asking it to offer its own interpretation and rewriting of the piece, just as a Doll might interpret the true feelings that someone wishes to express in a letter.</p>
<p>I am not sure how to end this.</p>
<p>The sheer capability of these tools has left me reeling somewhat in terms of their capabilites now that I have begun to lean into their use for particular tasks. I also genuinely feel a sense of discomfort about what the future might look like as they continue to develop. I certainly do not know enough to have any confident view of that future. I am neither a doomsayer nor someone who believes that these systems are going to be our saviours. Maybe that discomfort I feel just comes from the usual feeling of ageing and seeing the world changing around you.</p>
<p>But I do have this sudden feeling of… freedom.</p>
<p>Tasks that would previously have taken me a considerable amount of time now seem far easier to work through. I can see things that once occupied enormous amounts of headspace, and fed the obsessive tendencies that contribute to my longstanding insomnia, beginning to melt away.</p>
<p>Why has that model not converged? Why does that code keep producing an error? What is the right estimator for this estimand? Which assumptions am I missing?</p>
<p>Perhaps, in their place, I can find the headspace simply to relax. To sit with empty thoughts. To enjoy moments and actually be present within them with friends and family, or while pursuing other interests.</p>
<p>Or to watch <em>Violet Evergarden</em> and find myself moved to tears during pretty much every episode so far.</p>
<p>I am only on episode six.</p>
<hr>
</section>
<section id="the-dolls-retelling" class="level2">
<h2 data-anchor-id="the-dolls-retelling">The Doll’s retelling</h2>
<p>Over the past couple of weeks, I have had the disorienting experience of discovering that AI agents can do many of the things I struggle with better than I can.</p>
<p>This is not quite the admission it might initially appear to be. I am not conceding that an agent understands the scientific questions I care about better than I do, or that it can decide which models, analyses or inferential targets are worth pursuing. That substantive expertise remains mine. But once I can explain what I want, supply the relevant context, and impose the necessary scientific and statistical guardrails, an agent can often turn those intentions into working code more quickly, more systematically, and with fewer mistakes than I can.</p>
<p>It has taken me some time to become comfortable with that.</p>
<p>For a while, I did not use these tools at all. It felt alien to watch other people’s first instinct become “ask ChatGPT”, even when the problem was little more than informational recall. I was not really using agents for coding either, beyond a few experiments. When I ran into a problem, I still googled it and trawled through Stack Overflow or Stack Exchange in search of someone who had encountered something similar.</p>
<p>That began to change perhaps a year and a half ago. I started using agents in chat mode, asking them to debug code, suggest a better approach, or supply a small example that I could adapt. I treated them as advisers rather than coworkers.</p>
<p>I was particularly reluctant to use them for writing. Aside from administrative tasks, such as producing summaries or forcing an abstract beneath a journal’s word limit, I wanted to preserve a strong sense of authorship and ownership. I wanted the words to remain mine.</p>
<p>That boundary was never absolute. I sometimes used agents for more creative work, developing an RPG scenario from an idea that had occurred to me, or delegating the tiresome business of producing NPCs and stat sheets. Very occasionally, I would give an agent a piece of stream of consciousness writing and ask it to summarise what I was saying, suggest examples, or produce a draft that I could then edit. Much of my writing has always begun as scattered seeds: thoughts rehearsed in my head, fragments recorded in the moment, or bullet points returned to and cultivated over time. Asking an agent to help arrange those seeds was not entirely alien to that process. Still, I remained apprehensive.</p>
<p>The change came after a conversation with one of our technical founders at MacroFactor. He told me that he no longer really codes himself. Claude, or another sufficiently capable agent, does it better, he said, and makes fewer mistakes.</p>
<p>His role has shifted. He knows what the software needs to do. He provides the context, defines the task, establishes the guardrails, and reviews what comes back.</p>
<p>That observation gave me the push I needed to try working with agents in much the same way.</p>
<p>I am not an especially good programmer. My workflows are terrible. I care a great deal about transparency and reproducibility, and I think I achieve more of both than the average person in my field, yet I still make mistakes constantly. I lose time to errors, poorly organised processes, and problems whose solutions I lack the technical fluency to see quickly.</p>
<p>What I do have is substantive knowledge. I know the ideas I want to develop, the models I want to construct, the analyses I want to conduct, and the inferential targets I am trying to reach. Increasingly, I suspect that this combination, domain expertise together with the ability to direct and scrutinise an agent, will be enormously valuable. Without the expertise needed to specify a problem, recognise faulty assumptions, and judge an answer, it may be difficult even to know where to begin.</p>
<p>My first substantial experience of this kind of coworking was the rebuilding of this website. It had been built with Hugo and hosted through Netlify. I wanted to move it to Quarto and GitHub Pages. I could have done that myself, but it would have taken time and, almost certainly, involved several errors along the way. An agent did nearly all of it in next to no time, at least relative to how long it would have taken me.</p>
<p>That experience forms part of a much longer effort to make my working life smaller.</p>
<p>For several years, I have been trying to prune my to-do list and reduce my obligations. In academia, I had fallen into the familiar habit of saying yes to almost anything that seemed interesting. I joined too many projects and accepted too many commitments. There was an element of academic incentive in this, although I do not especially like to admit it. But there was also something more sincere and, in its own way, more dangerous: the conviction that I ought to help raise the quality of the work around me and push the field forward, both methodologically and through greater transparency and reproducibility.</p>
<p>Eventually, I began saying no. I wanted to do less and to do it better. Even if my work was far above the prevailing standard in some respects, I knew how often it still fell short of the standard I wanted for it.</p>
<p>I also knew what the work was taking from me.</p>
<p>It filled early mornings, late evenings, and weekends. Problems followed me away from my desk. I became obsessive. A model that would not converge or an error I could not explain would occupy space in my mind long after I had stopped actively working on it. Questions about estimators, estimands, and unexamined assumptions would accompany me to bed, feeding into the insomnia with which I have struggled for years.</p>
<p>Deleting social media was part of an attempt to reclaim that mental space. The problem was not ordinary social media distraction so much as the intensely specialised worlds connected to my work and academic interests. Sometimes those spaces contained the worst forms of those subcultures. But even at their best, when people were thoughtful and cordial, shared valuable work, and prompted genuine learning, they filled my mind with precisely the subjects from which I needed occasional distance.</p>
<p>Within hours of briefly reinstalling social media after a holiday, I found myself scrolling and felt that familiar, horrible buzzing in my head. These were interesting ideas, but I did not want to be involuntarily thinking about them while spending time with people I loved. I did not want work, however valuable or absorbing, to remain the gravitational centre of my attention.</p>
<p>For years, I have uninstalled social media and even messaging apps whenever I go on holiday so that I can properly switch off. Deleting social media altogether was an attempt to create more of that separation in ordinary life. I wanted the headspace to taste more of life.</p>
<p>Then, this past week, I began watching <em>Violet Evergarden</em>.</p>
<p>It would be reductive to say that the Auto Memory Dolls are analogous to AI agents. The series is concerned with recovery, emotion, connection, and the difficult process of learning to understand both oneself and other people. I do not imagine it was secretly anticipating ChatGPT.</p>
<p>Still, it is hard to miss the resonance while sitting here, pouring an unfinished essay into an agent and asking it to help me discover the shape of what I am trying to say.</p>
<p>The Dolls help people translate thoughts and feelings into words. Their task is not merely transcription. They listen, interpret, and attempt to express something that the person themselves cannot yet articulate. Increasingly, people are asking agents to perform a related role, not only to produce text, but to help them find an expression for ideas that remain scattered, incomplete, or obscure even to themselves.</p>
<p>There is an obvious irony in asking an agent to help me write about my discomfort with agents. The irony deepens because “Coworking with an Auto Memory Doll” was the first title that occurred to me, before I asked the agent to suggest any. It returned the same phrase to me among its ideas, unaware that the thought had already been mine.</p>
<p>But perhaps that is also the point. I supplied the experiences, the judgements, the uncertainty, and the feeling. The agent helps me arrange them into a form that I can inspect, reject, correct, and ultimately make my own. The originating thought remains mine, as does the judgement that recognises which expression is right.</p>
<p>I still care about ownership of my writing. I do not want to outsource the process of knowing what I think. But I am becoming more open to the possibility that a tool can help me express those thoughts without replacing them, and that it can take on some of the work surrounding my substantive expertise without diminishing that expertise.</p>
<p>My apprehension has not disappeared. The capabilities of frontier agents have left me reeling, and I feel genuine discomfort when I try to imagine where their continued development might lead. I know too little to make confident predictions. I am neither convinced that they will destroy us nor persuaded that they will save us. Perhaps some of the discomfort is simply the familiar experience of ageing and watching the world change around you.</p>
<p>What I had not anticipated was the feeling of freedom.</p>
<p>Tasks that once demanded a considerable amount of time now seem far easier to work through. Problems that occupied enormous amounts of headspace, and fed the obsessive tendencies behind my longstanding insomnia, have begun to feel as though they might melt away.</p>
<p>Why has that model not converged? Why does that code keep producing an error? What is the right estimator for this estimand? Which assumptions am I missing?</p>
<p>Perhaps the model that will not converge can remain at my desk rather than following me into bed. Perhaps an error can be diagnosed without consuming a weekend. Perhaps the machinery needed to carry an idea into practice can become less burdensome, leaving me with more energy for the part that actually requires my judgement.</p>
<p>And perhaps the time returned to me does not have to become more productive time.</p>
<p>That is what has surprised me most. After years of trying to reduce my obligations and resist the tendency to fill every available space with work, my first thought is not that agents will allow me to add everything back again. I hope I can resist that temptation.</p>
<p>Instead, the time can remain empty.</p>
<p>It can become time spent with friends and family while actually being present with them. Time for hobbies that have nothing to do with work. Time to relax without some unresolved technical problem buzzing beneath the surface of thought.</p>
<p>Or time to watch <em>Violet Evergarden</em> and be unexpectedly moved to tears, episode after episode.</p>
<p>I am only six episodes in. But for the moment, that feels like a glimpse of the life I have been trying to make room for.</p>


</section>


<div id="quarto-appendix" class="default"><section id="footnotes" class="footnotes footnotes-end-of-document"><h2 class="anchored quarto-appendix-heading">Footnotes</h2>

<ol>
<li id="fn1"><p>Mostly because I wanted to stop it encroaching on my headspace in the way it tends to do. Even after having it back on my phone for only a couple of hours having reinstalled it on returning from holiday (so that I could export my data and make one final post), I found myself scrolling again and feeling that horrible buzzing sensation in my mind. I have tried to explain to my “normie” family and friends that it is not even ordinary social-media stuff. It is the niche subcultures related to my work and academic interests, sometimes in their worst forms. Even when it is the really good stuff, when things are discussed sensibly and cordially, and people share things of genuine value from which I learn or which prompt my own thinking and reflection, I find that the topics towards which I gravitate are precisely the kind that sit in my head afterwards. I cannot stop thinking about them. And I do not want to be thinking about them while spending time with loved ones or trying to engage in other hobbies and interests. I want to spend more time enjoying my life outside work, rather than having work remain the primary thing towards which my attention is drawn. For roughly the past five years, whenever I have gone on holiday I have uninstalled social media, and even messaging apps, so that I can properly switch off. Deleting social media was an attempt to create more of that separation in my ordinary life.↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn2"><p>I should note, that one of the first coworking tasks I used an agent for was updating my website. It was previously all in hugo and I wanted to change it all to quarto. It was also hosted through netlify and I wanted to shift to github pages. Sure, I could have done it all myself, but it probably would have taken me sometime and several errors. The agent did in all in next to no time relatively speaking.↩︎</p></li>
</ol>
</section></div> ]]></description>
  <category>AI</category>
  <category>Agents</category>
  <category>Coding</category>
  <category>Writing</category>
  <category>Work</category>
  <category>Violet Evergarden</category>
  <guid>https://steele-research.com/notes/coworking-with-an-auto-memory-doll/</guid>
  <pubDate>Sun, 30 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
  <title>How trained are ‘trained’ participants?</title>
  <link>https://steele-research.com/notes/how-trained-are-trained-participants/</link>
  <description><![CDATA[ 




<div class="reading-metrics" aria-label="1,951 words; estimated reading time: 10 minutes">
<p>1,951 words · 10 min read</p>
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<div class="quarto-figure quarto-figure-center">
<figure class="figure">
<p><img src="https://steele-research.com/notes/how-trained-are-trained-participants/untrained-research-meme.png" class="img-fluid quarto-figure quarto-figure-center figure-img" alt="Astronaut meme reading: So untrained research is trained research? Always has been." width="760"></p>
</figure>
</div>
<p><em>An original version of this note was posted on both LinkedIn and Instagram on 10 June 2026 prior to my deleting my social media accounts. But, as I and colleagues were discussing this recently, I decided to revive the post, update it, and repost as an excuse to add some funny memes we’d shared with each other too.</em></p>
<p>When a study describes its participants as “trained”, the label often carries a lot of weight for folks in the so-called “science-based” lifting space. People are constantly clamouring for more studies on trained lifters and complain that studies on untrained participants don’t tell us anything relevant for the former. But, what if I were to tell you that there’s very likely not a whole lot of difference between most existing studies of “untrained” and “trained” lifters.</p>
<p>Fry and colleagues, in their recent scientometric review<sup>1</sup> titled <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/42417489/">Tons of resistance exercise research, but does it apply to highly trained athletes?</a>, highlight the issue right from the get-go noting that “…the use of vague study subject descriptors such as “trained” or “untrained” lead to confusion.” They also highlight the usual refrain from people that there are relatively few studies of “trained” or “highly trained” individuals<sup>2</sup>. Across recent systematic reviews and meta-analyses the included studies were, by and large (70.5%), conducted in untrained and previously sedentary participants.</p>
<p>The distinction between trained and untrained participants matters because adaptation appears to follow a roughly linear–logarithmic course: gains are comparatively large early in exposure and diminish as effective exposure accumulates. Our <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02701367.2022.2070592">longitudinal modelling of strength adaptation</a> in addition to a re-analysis using <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38037792/">meta-regression of the large RCT dataset</a><sup>3</sup> in untrained individuals regarding adaptation over time helped establish that pattern as a theory for testing. Further, <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38060089/">analyses of competitive powerlifters</a> in the <a href="https://openpowerlifting.gitlab.io/opl-csv/">Open Powerlifting Dataset</a>, also demonstrate this logarithmic pattern of performance increase albeit with far smaller magnitudes which we might expect if we assume that folks competing in powerlifting have typically trained somewhat before that and are consistently training pretty hard<sup>4</sup>. Lastly, estimates from recent high-powered studies of genuinely well-trained <a href="https://www.discoverstrength.com/">Discover Strength</a> participants<sup>5</sup> have severely tested the models predictions and provided strong experimental corroboration. The effects the model predicts, and we have found in these studies, are small because these participants have already travelled a long way along the adaptation curve.</p>
<p>But, people have still been surprised by the estimated magnitudes of effects we have reported. Of course, it’s not been a surprise to us; they’ve been incredibly close to the predictions from the theoretical linear-log model of adaptation to resistance training over time<sup>6</sup>. What is surprising to people though is that they are sooo much smaller than many other studies purportedly using “trained” participants. In fact, most of the time the effect magnitudes seen in studies of “untrained” and “trained” participants are pretty much the same<sup>7</sup>, which could be interpreted as evidence falsifying the linear-logarithmic theory of adaptation.</p>
<p>However, there’s an alternative explanation for why this might be the case… the “trained” participants in most<sup>8</sup> of these studies are not anywhere near as trained as people think.</p>
<div class="quarto-figure quarto-figure-center">
<figure class="figure">
<p><img src="https://steele-research.com/notes/how-trained-are-trained-participants/trained-vs-untrained-same-picture.png" class="img-fluid quarto-figure quarto-figure-center figure-img" alt="The Office meme comparing a study on untrained participants with a study on participants reporting prior training experience; Pam says they are the same picture." width="500"></p>
</figure>
</div>
<p>Two lines of evidence from other work we have conducted lead me to suspect this.</p>
<p>Generally, when folks are left to their own devices to both self-select loads, and the number of repetitions they perform (and thus proximity to failure), they generally train with ~53% of their 1RM performing sets of repetitions that leave them about ~10 repetitions shy of failure. Hardly a particularly effective stimulus. Our previous <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s40279-022-01717-9">meta-analysis of self-selected resistance exercise</a> demonstrates this.</p>
<p>In addition, in our recent <a href="https://storkjournals.org/index.php/cik/article/view/8030">study of supervision during training and effort</a> we took both historical training data from <a href="https://www.kieser.com.au/">Kieser Australia</a> members <em>in situ</em> as well as members recruited to participate in an experimental study. We also limited this to members with at least 6 months of prior training experience at Kieser verified by their training records. In the historical <em>in situ</em> data we found that, independent of supervision, members don’t train as hard as prescribed<sup>9</sup>. But, in the experimental study participants train much harder<sup>10</sup>, both unsupervised and supervised, though train even harder when supervised<sup>11</sup>.</p>
<p>If it’s the case that, despite reporting they have trained for X period of time, prior to participation most “trained” participants’ training exposure had been this suboptimal, it’s unsurprising we see effect sizes bigger than we expect based on the well corroborated linear-logarithmic theory. In contrast, the model itself shows what happens if you take participants who are untrained, or in this case relatively untrained despite nominally being classified as “trained”, and then expose them to an effective training stimulus from the get-go over time.</p>
<p>Considering this I have greater confidence that the studies we have performed with Discover Strength included participants that could properly be considered “trained” in some meaningful sense; they had all been training following high-effort, albeit relatively low-volume, supervised programmes for at least 6 months and typically longer. This has been one of the benefits of conducting studies with Discover Strength where, given the nature of their approach, participants recruited into the studies are probably some of the most well trained in the literature. The magnitudes of the effect estimates we subsequently find when conducting studies with this population are in fact evidence of their prior training status.</p>
<p>So, when folks clamour for more studies on “trained” participants, a tongue in cheek response is<sup>12</sup>…</p>
<div class="quarto-figure quarto-figure-center">
<figure class="figure">
<p><img src="https://steele-research.com/notes/how-trained-are-trained-participants/more-trained-studies-you-have-them.png" class="img-fluid quarto-figure quarto-figure-center figure-img" alt="Meme responding to demands for more studies of trained participants: You have them." width="700"></p>
</figure>
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<p>But in all seriousness it’s not wrong to say we don’t have much data on trained participants when we consider things this way. Training status, in my opinion, is probably better understood as accumulated <em>effective</em> exposure, not simply time since somebody first joined a gym and started sandbagging it with their mates, going through the motions. Load, effort, adherence, progression, exercise specificity and the consistency of the stimulus all contribute to how well trained someone is with respect to a given outcome such as strength performance or hypertrophy. A person may have years of “experience” yet remain relatively untrained with respect to the intervention and outcome under study. Put them into a closely monitored experiment, improve the stimulus, and a response similar to what we see in previously sedentary untrained participants is no longer surprising.</p>
<p>This does not mean that every unexpectedly large effect in a trained sample is explained by poor prior training, nor that findings in untrained participants automatically generalise to highly trained people. Training history may in fact modify effects both in terms of the general effect magnitude of an intervention and the comparative effects of different interventions. Also, the people who persist long enough to become genuinely well trained may also be a selected group<sup>13</sup>. The narrower methodological point is that “trained” is a theoretical construct, not a box validated by asking how many months someone has exercised.</p>
<p>Although not easy to do, researchers should try to better describe and, where possible, verify the training that participants actually performed before enrolment: recent loads, proximity to failure, progression, adherence and performance trajectory. Until then, much of what is called research in trained populations may be research in relatively untrained populations wearing a more impressive label than is deserved.</p>




<div id="quarto-appendix" class="default"><section id="footnotes" class="footnotes footnotes-end-of-document"><h2 class="anchored quarto-appendix-heading">Footnotes</h2>

<ol>
<li id="fn1"><p>Hat tip to Drs Helms and Trexler over at the <a href="https://massresearchreview.com/">MASS Research Review</a> and <a href="https://massresearchreview.com/resources/podcasts/ironculture/">Iron Culture</a>. I’d initially missed this paper being published but picked up on it as it was discussed on their <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjN-1IuBC0w">recent podcast episode</a> and covered in MASS.↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn2"><p>Fry and colleagues based their classification of participant training status based upon the <a href="https://journals.humankinetics.com/view/journals/ijspp/17/2/article-p317.xml">recent system proposed by McKay et al.</a>. Though this classification system and others (e.g., <a href="https://www.ovid.com/jnls/nsca-scj/abstract/10.1519/ssc.0000000000000627~classification-and-determination-model-of-resistance?redirectionsource=fulltextview">this one by Santos Junior et al.</a>) have tended to also include performance levels, for the purpose of this note I am more interested in the conceptualisation of “training status” as being related to the extent of prior exposure to training. Whilst the two are related given we know that training is effective to increase performance, some folks will just never ever get to a status that would be considered to fit the higher tiers of these systems no matter how much they train. Similarly, some folks are elite, and even more rarely world class, with little to no training whatsoever. Intercept variance is our biggest source of variance here. Others such as <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28066901/">Buckner and colleagues have argued</a> that performance doesn’t tell us much about training status. If we want to see how training effects are conditional upon performance level then selecting individuals with high levels of the performance outcome of interest (and perhaps with or without prior training) would be a desirable design characteristic of a study. If we want to understand whether training effects are conditional on training status then we should select individuals for whom we can determine the prior training exposure in terms of time/duration and specificity.↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn3"><p>These re-analyses were performed as part of planning and pre-registration of our recent trials in trained participants for both strength and hypertrophy outcomes, building on our previous longitudinal modelling. You can see me talk about this “strong” theory development and testing, including these re-analyses <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=39Ajm1dwFx0">in this talk</a>.↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn4"><p>Meaning that they are already trained relative to say the population in our longitudinal study or the untrained populations included in the large RCT dataset, both of which yield similar magnitudes of estimates over the typical time frame for a resistance training study.↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn5"><p>Including our trials of <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02640414.2025.2567805">lengthened partial training</a> and <a href="https://doi.org/10.51224/sportrxiv.810">fractional training volume</a>.↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn6"><p>Though I will genuinely admit that it does still surprise me to this day just how close they are. This level of specification in theory such that it can yield precise quantitative predictions that are then borne out in highly powered statistical tests is certainly not a common thing outside of the far more established quantitative sciences. For sport and exercise science it is pretty much unheard of.↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn7"><p>For example, recent meta-analyses such as those from <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38970765/">Robinson et al.&nbsp;on proximity to failure</a>, and <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/41343037/">Pelland et al.&nbsp;on training volume</a> both found that the magnitude of estimates were relatively unaffected by whether participants in included studies were reported as “untrained” or “trained”. Further, recently <a href="https://sportrxiv.org/index.php/server/preprint/view/910/version/1126">the largest evidence synthesis ever performed</a> of direct hypertrophy outcomes from resistance training studies further supports our theory that effects are approximately a logarithmic function (actually, a linear AND logarithmic function) of time and that after roughly a year they begin to plateau (this is where the linear part of the function actually allows the model to plateau, the vertical dashed line on the right hand plots, whereas a log only function in this kind of data is positively monotonic everywhere). In a similar vein to the Robinson et al.&nbsp;and Pelland et al.&nbsp;analyses though, it also found no impact of participant training status on the magnitude of effects.↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn8"><p>Note, I am not saying <em>all</em>, just <em>most</em>. There are certainly studies stating participants are “trained” where we can be more certain about their prior exposures to effective training e.g., our studies with Discover Strength.↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn9"><p>They are prescribed training to failure, but are nowhere near this in practice and also use loads that are far too light.↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn10"><p>Perhaps a “study” effect.↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn11"><p>Note, members at Kieser are still adapting and gaining strength so, despite the stimulus being suboptimal in practice in comparison to what is prescribed, it’s not entirely ineffective.↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn12"><p>Dr Zac Robinson gets due credit for this meme.↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn13"><p>Further adding to the point about performance itself being a poor operationalisation of training status. Those who don’t perform well may be more likely to not continue with training for whatever reason.↩︎</p></li>
</ol>
</section></div> ]]></description>
  <category>Resistance Training</category>
  <category>Methods</category>
  <category>Training Status</category>
  <guid>https://steele-research.com/notes/how-trained-are-trained-participants/</guid>
  <pubDate>Fri, 21 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
  <title>Choosing what there is</title>
  <link>https://steele-research.com/notes/choosing-what-there-is/</link>
  <description><![CDATA[ 




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<p>In <a href="../borges-and-popper/">my previous note on Borges and Popper</a>, I considered two presentations of a common sense argument for realism. Both begin from the thought that there are things (e.g., Bach’s music for Popper and a line from Victor Hugo for Borges) that I know<sup>1</sup> I could not have created. For me, this line of argument is a satisfying reason to adopt a realist stance. But, as Popper freely admitted, it is not a conclusive one. Metaphysical and ontological realism, remain positions we adopt and then work from rather than a finding we can establish empirically.</p>
<p>Two papers I read last year<sup>2</sup> help, I think, to draw out what follows from that point. The first, David Ludwig’s <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-015-9793-3"><em>Ontological Choices and the Value-Free Ideal</em></a>, complicates the common division encountered between questions of fact and questions of value; the so called <em>value-free ideal</em>. Ontology is often presented as if it were something settled before science begins: first decide what exists, then gather evidence and discover facts about it. Ludwig’s point is that scientists’ ontological choices are inherently value laden.</p>
<p>This challenges the value-free ideal once we take a moment to ask why one scientific ontology is chosen rather than another. The relevant considerations are not always exclusively epistemic ones particularly when they stem from our metaphysical commitment<sup>3</sup>. A result of this is an impact on the truth value of scientific statements as they are always made relative to a chosen ontology typically influenced by a chosen metaphysics.</p>
<p>But, whilst many take metaphysical and ontological realism to come hand in hand in science, the second paper, Alberto Corti’s <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10699-020-09705-w"><em>Scientific Realism Without Reality? What Happens When Metaphysics is Left Out</em></a>, separates these two issues that are often bundled together. <em>Metaphysical realism</em> is, roughly, the claim that there is a structured, mind-independent external world. <em>Scientific realism</em> concerns the ontological position regarding whether we should take scientific theories as real at face value, including their claims about unobservable entities.</p>
<p>Scientific realists commonly accept metaphysical realism as well, but Corti argues that scientific realism does not logically require it. It is possible to adopt scientific realism yet metaphysical agnosticism. I particularly found the thought experiment of Alice the solipsist, and Bob, to demonstrate this very nicely:</p>
<blockquote class="blockquote">
<p>Let us suppose that Alice is a solipsist, i.e.&nbsp;she holds the view that she is the only real entity, and external reality is entirely the product of her mental activity. Alice notices that her reality presents many regularities. Moreover, she notices that some of her ideas (called ‘scientists’) study these regularities and claim that they are due to the existence of unobservable entities. Alice believes the scientists’ claims and thinks that (at least some of) these unobservable entities exist, in the sense that they are as real as her other ideas (like her idea of tables, chairs and the scientists themselves). Therefore, she has a strong disagreement with Bob, who think that scientific theories allow us only to make accurate predictions. According to Bob, indeed, we are rationally justified in believing only in those entities that human beings can observe directly.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Alice is a metaphysical anti-realist but, in this deliberately strange sense, also a scientific realist. The thought experiment is not intended to argue <em>for</em> solipsism. It merely shows that the two forms of realism are not inherently incompatible. Even someone who denies a mind-independent world can distinguish between taking the entities posited by science seriously and treating them as useful fictions. In essence, treating the imaginings of their mind as the reality that science is intended to investigate and explain.</p>
<p>This is a useful continuation of the Borges and Popper discussion. Their arguments offer an intuitive reason to reject solipsism and accept metaphysical realism, but they cannot prove it. Corti shows that this limitation need not force us into solipsism nor a kind of scientific instrumentalism. We can remain serious about the entities described by our best theories while being modest about the metaphysical foundations of that commitment.</p>
<p>Taken together, the two papers suggest a position of metaphysical humility without paralysis by analysis; a way to take a stance and move on to “getting shit done”<sup>4</sup>. I personally remain a metaphysical realist, and ontological realist in so far as I take the scientific task, for the common sense reasons described previously, but it is helpful to see more clearly which parts of scientific inquiry actually depend upon that commitment, and which do not. It’s also useful to see that scientists, both metaphysical realists and metaphysical solipsists, could set the question of metaphysics aside as, in many ways, irrelevant to the scientific task. Whilst they may not agree exactly <em>what</em> it is that exists and what it <em>means</em> in their ontologies in any metaphysical sense, they can still agree (or not) regarding what does exist ontologically speaking and upon methods for how to go about investigating and understanding it.</p>




<div id="quarto-appendix" class="default"><section id="footnotes" class="footnotes footnotes-end-of-document"><h2 class="anchored quarto-appendix-heading">Footnotes</h2>

<ol>
<li id="fn1"><p>Or at the very least, suspect, I could not have created. The solipsist might counter the strong “I know I could not have created” argument by claiming, as Popper notes “I may perhaps underrate myself (and at the same time overrate myself) in my dream.”↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn2"><p>Yeah… I’m plumbing some of the exported data from my deleted social media accounts to start as the basis for some content. Given that both my recent reading/re-reading of Borges and Popper had brought this topic back to my attention I remembered having read the papers referred to in this note, and having posted about them on Bluesky. So I went back to remind myself and write a short note expanding on the posts for the site to try and keep some momentum going for my writing here… though, despite capitalising on thoughts as they come, who knows if I’ll keep up this frequency of posting going forwards.↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn3"><p>For example, I might say “I adopt metaphysical realism and <em>therefore</em> the things that make up my ontology are also real mind-independent things”. Of course, the choice of exactly what we think makes up our ontology is also a source of possible disagreement. The majority of Ludwig’s paper tackles this and provides interesting examples of the impact of choices in this regard.↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn4"><p>To quote friend and colleague <a href="https://www.immersiveresearch.co.uk/thoughts-and-ideas/getting-shit-done-part-one?rq=getting%20shit%20done">Dr Chris Matthews</a>.↩︎</p></li>
</ol>
</section></div> ]]></description>
  <category>Philosophy of Science</category>
  <category>Realism</category>
  <category>Ontology</category>
  <category>Values in Science</category>
  <guid>https://steele-research.com/notes/choosing-what-there-is/</guid>
  <pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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<item>
  <title>Borges and Popper</title>
  <link>https://steele-research.com/notes/borges-and-popper/</link>
  <description><![CDATA[ 




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<p>Realism, or indeed any metaphysical or ontological positionality that we adopt, is not something we can prove. I tried to stress this in the introductory chapter to philosophy of science for a forthcoming textbook on research methods in the sport and exercise sciences<sup>1</sup>:</p>
<blockquote class="blockquote">
<p>“In reflecting about your ontological position there is one thing to keep in mind; it is inherently assumptive. We cannot go out and empirically test these assumptions to have knowledge of whether they are ‘true’… It is worth stating clearly here that it is absolutely fine to embrace the subjectivity of your ontological position. You may hold a particular intuition about it; a belief, or a tendency to believe, or a feeling that something seems to be the case. It is also perfectly acceptable to be unsure about it and to reflect upon it from time to time. It is also no problem to adopt different positions because of this reflection over time or because in a particular context there are non-epistemic values(i.e., values not pertaining to knowledge or its generation such as moral or aesthetic values) that lead to a given choice regarding ontology.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Now, to be clear, I am a realist though I am comfortable with the fact that this is something I cannot make any conclusive argument about. But, there are certain things which, at the very least, satisfy me in adopting this position. One of these is what could be called the argument from <em>common-sense</em><sup>2</sup>. In <em>Realism and the Aim of Science</em> Karl Popper, after reminding us of this fact of the inconclusivity of any arguments in this vein<sup>3</sup>, presents his argument:</p>
<blockquote class="blockquote">
<p>“My argument is this. I know that I have not created Bach’s music, or Mozart’s; that I have not created Rembrandt’s pictures, or Botticelli’s. I am quite certain that I never could do anything like it: I just do not have it in me. (I know this particularly well since I made many attempts to copy Bach; it made me more appreciative of his inventive power.) I know that I do not have the imagination to write anything like the Iliad or the Inferno or The Tempest. If possible, I am even less able to draw an average comic strip, or to invent a television advertisement, or to write some of the books on the justification of induction which I am compelled to read. But on the solipsistic hypothesis, all these creations would be those of my own dreams. They would be creatures of my own imagination. For there would be no other minds: there would be nothing but my mind. I know that this cannot be true.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Another<sup>4</sup>, Jorge Luis Borges, made a strikingly similar argument in literary form in his short story <em>The Other</em><sup>5</sup>. In the story the older Borges, meeting his younger self, tries to prove that he is not merely being dreamed by the young man:</p>
<blockquote class="blockquote">
<p>‘I was struck by a sudden idea. “I can prove to you this minute,” I said, “that you aren’t dreaming me. Listen to this line of poetry. So far as I can recall, you’ve never heard it before.” I slowly intoned the famous line: “L’hydreunivers tordant son corpse caillé d’astres.” I could sense his almost fear-stricken bafflement. He repeated the line softly, savoring each glowing word. “It’s true,” he stammered, “I could never write a line like that.” Hugo had brought us together.’</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Whether one influenced the others argument is not clear as Popper had noted it is “…not impossible that my simple argument for the existence of other minds has been used by others before (although I do not think it has)”. This correspondence between the two could be mere coincidence. Either way, having begun re-reading <em>Realism and the Aim of Science</em> recently, the similarity struck me whilst reading <em>The Other</em> on holiday<sup>6</sup></p>




<div id="quarto-appendix" class="default"><section id="footnotes" class="footnotes footnotes-end-of-document"><h2 class="anchored quarto-appendix-heading">Footnotes</h2>

<ol>
<li id="fn1"><p>You can read a preprint version of it <a href="https://sportrxiv.org/index.php/server/preprint/view/366">here</a>.↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn2"><p>Although I also like the idea of calling it the <em>charming</em> argument after how reviewer of Popper’s <em>Realism and the Aim of Science</em>, Anthony O’Hear, <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2254816">described it</a>: “Popper finds that ‘realism is so obviously true’ that straightforward counter-arguments are trite and distasteful, though I must say that I found Popper’s argument against solipsistic idealism charming.”↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn3"><p>He notes “…I always remember that in this kind of inquiry no arguments can be conclusive.” and further “[t]he argument is of course inconclusive. I may perhaps underrate myself (and at the same time overrate myself) in my dream. Or the category of creation may not be applicable. All this is understood. Nevertheless, the argument satisfies me completely.”↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn4"><p>“The” Other?↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn5"><p>As I have noted before someone has shared a pdf version of Borges Collected Ficciones <a href="https://posthegemony.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/borges_collected-fictions.pdf">here</a> which is actually the version I have on my kindle (it’s nicely optimised in terms of layout for reading on a kindle despite being a pdf).↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn6"><p>Though actually I first noticed this correspondence when Dave and Tamler covered the story on an episode of <a href="https://verybadwizards.com/episode/episode-332-talking-to-myself-the-other-by-jorge-luis-borges">Very Bad Wizards</a> earlier this year.↩︎</p></li>
</ol>
</section></div> ]]></description>
  <category>Philosophy of Science</category>
  <category>Realism</category>
  <category>Literature</category>
  <category>Borges</category>
  <category>Popper</category>
  <guid>https://steele-research.com/notes/borges-and-popper/</guid>
  <pubDate>Mon, 17 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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  <title>Science is a Tower</title>
  <link>https://steele-research.com/notes/science-is-a-tower/</link>
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<p>I recently returned from holiday in Es Canar, Ibiza where I spent my time mostly relaxing with Emma, enjoying the sun, the pool, the beach, taking walks, boat trips out, eating, drinking, but also reading. When away I tend to read a little non-fiction, usually whatever broader philosophical works I happen to be reading at the time<sup>1</sup> is my morning coffee read. But the rest of the time I make sure to read fiction, usually science fiction or fantasy<sup>2</sup>.</p>
<p>This holiday I was after something to scratch the itch that had been left after reading stories like those from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ted_Chiang">Ted Chiang</a>. I’d heard of, but had not delved into, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SCP_Foundation">SCP Foundation</a> before, the collaborative fiction project covering the workings of its namesakes work in capturing, containing, and studying unknowns and anomalies such as paranormal, supernatural, and other mysterious phenomena. The author <a href="https://qntm.org/">qntm</a>, who had contributed broadly to this project, had popped up as a recommendation based on my enjoyment of Chiang’s work. So I ventured to read some of his stories whilst on holiday this time.</p>
<p>I started with <a href="https://qntm.org/vhitaos">Valuable Humans in Transit and Other Stories</a>, and after that moved onto what appeared to be the most intriguing work to me: <a href="https://qntm.org/antimemetics">There Is No Antimemetics Division</a>. I enjoyed both thoroughly, and the latter so much that it sparked a radical idea for an experimental role-playing game scenario that I have developed and will be testing out with my regular group in the near future. But it was a short story in the former, “If You Are Reading This” which you can read <a href="https://qntm.org/readin">here</a>, that prompted me to pen this brief note with the main purpose of sharing a quote that struck a chord with me.</p>
<p>Here’s the quote:</p>
<blockquote class="blockquote">
<p>“Trev put it like this: science is a tower which he and all other scientists are all trying to make taller. The lower levels are all filled in and sturdy, but the higher you go, the more gaps there are. The people right at the cutting edge looking for dark energy and Higgs bosons and symmetry violations are perched on the very top of the pile, hurling bricks into clear air to see what finds purchase. Meanwhile, Those Also Serve Who Stay Behind And Fill In The Gaps. They need filling. Trev called this janitorial science, because you’re fixing up the incomplete job, the mess left behind by someone else.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The quote appears to me to lean on the classic allegory from Bernard Forscher, <a href="https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.142.3590.339.a">Chaos in the Brickyard</a>, but in this sense there is some semblance of structure wherein scientists are at least trying to build something out of their bricks. But, the latter part… the filling in of the gaps… the fixing up of the mess… the checking of foundations… the “janitorial science”… this is what struck a chord for me.</p>
<p>Many in the latest methodological reform movement(s) (or whatever label you want to give to it) have drawn attention to the need for this kind of “boring” scientific work. Of detailing the logical structures of our concepts, careful descriptive work, replicable inference regarding the existence of stable phenomena, building of theories aimed at explaining these phenomena and then devising severe tests of their deductively entailed predictions, the checking of all the auxiliary theories and the assumptions inherent in our empirical work, the estimates we make, and the tests we perform. The work required in the whole length of the derivation chain is slow, and laborious, and to many… well, boring. But it’s essential.</p>
<p>It’s this kind of foundational<sup>3</sup> work that I personally believe is far more important and meaningful than the typical “sexy science” that garners everyone’s attention; both public and scientific attention.</p>
<p>Science is a tower, and we should be grateful for the janitors of the tower that clean up all the brickdust and other detritus left behind by the brickmakers.</p>




<div id="quarto-appendix" class="default"><section id="footnotes" class="footnotes footnotes-end-of-document"><h2 class="anchored quarto-appendix-heading">Footnotes</h2>

<ol>
<li id="fn1"><p>I do try to explicitly avoid reading anything that is very directly tied to current work so as to switch off from it. But I do appreciate the freedom from this to think a bit more broadly and so hence still reading some non-fiction whilst away.↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn2"><p>And, to be honest, often philosophically oriented… For the past few years I have had the Collected Ficciones (a book collecting all of his stories translated to English) of Jorge Luis Borges on the go and each time we take a holiday or trip I’ll tend to read some of the stories in it. Someone has shared a pdf version of it <a href="https://posthegemony.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/borges_collected-fictions.pdf">here</a> which is actually the version I have on my kindle (it’s nicely optimised in terms of layout for reading on a kindle despite being a pdf).↩︎</p></li>
<li id="fn3"><p>And, even prior to that, the consideration of what philosophical assumptions, ontological, espistemological, axiological, we bring along for the ride. I have tried to stress the importance of this first and foremost in the opening chapter for a forthcoming textbook on research methods in the sport and exercise sciences. You can read a preprint version <a href="https://sportrxiv.org/index.php/server/preprint/view/366">here</a>.↩︎</p></li>
</ol>
</section></div> ]]></description>
  <category>Science</category>
  <category>Philosophy of Science</category>
  <category>Methods</category>
  <guid>https://steele-research.com/notes/science-is-a-tower/</guid>
  <pubDate>Wed, 12 Aug 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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